Professor Rzepliński began his remarks by defining freedom as a fundamental value of the Constitution of Poland, deriving it from the principle of the democratic state (Art. 2 Constitution). The notion of freedom, in turn, appears 81 times in the text of the Constitution (by way of comparison, the German constitution, 1/3 longer than its Polish counterpart, mentions freedom 33 times). Frequent reference to this notion by the constitutional legislator is associated with memory of " … the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland" (preamble to the Constitution of Poland). This explains why the Preamble of this fundamental law contains mention of the thirst to guarantee civil rights "forever". The Constitution is defined as the fundamental law for a state "based on respect for freedom". Later in the Preamble is mention of the "right to freedom" grounded in the inherent dignity of the person. The speaker defined freedom as a space for the functioning of every individual which the State (authorities) had essentially no access to, and in which we autonomously regulate our own functioning within this space without need of any assistance from public authorities. We take responsibility for the exercise of freedom within the borders of constitutional values and without the need for any additional action on the part of the State. The vision of freedom in the 1997 Constitution of Poland is different from the vision of the 1952 Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, in which particular freedoms (paragraph 1) were subjected to the condition of their appropriate exercise (paragraph 2) ("As a rule, the second paragraph served to suppress freedom"). By way of illustration prof. Rzepliński cited Art. 83(2) of the 1952 PPR Constitution, which mentions "putting into effect the freedom of speech". Referencing these observations to the 1997 Constitution, which declares in Art. 5 that "The Republic of Poland shall … ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens …", he said: "I am suspicious of those provisions in the Constitution which contain the word 'ensure', and this word appears very frequently in our Constitution, 33 times" (for comparison: in the German Constitution it appears 13 times). Similarly, the State ensuring freedom for the creation and functioning of political parties (Art. 11(1)) is, according to Andrzej Rzepliński, unnecessary, and it would be sufficient to capture this freedom in Art. 12, discussing freedom of association and civil society institutions. Ensuring freedom of the press and other means of social communication also need not be a competence of the public authorities (Art. 14).
As a constitutional judge, Andrzej Rzepliński was also inspired by the words of President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt, spoken on 6 January 1941, shortly before the USA entered World War II, and devoted to the "four freedoms": 1) freedom of speech and expression, 2) freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, 3) freedom from fear, 4) freedom from want [...] which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants 1 . These freedoms have been captured in many words within the Polish Constitution as well, but as the speaker remarked, they are too frequently dressed with an additional role of public authorities: "In the context of freedom, I also feel that the constitutional lawmaker needlessly employs the notion that public authorities either can or cannot do something. Either there is freedom, or we give public authorities -here we hesitate -we give them something, or precisely the opposite"). The special guest cited a verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal of 1 March 2011 (P 21/09) 2 , in which the Tribunal held that the personal freedom of the individual and the right to personal freedom guarantee the freedom of each individual from arbitrary conduct by public authorities, and protect everyone from fear of their own state, including against politically motivated deprivation of freedom in any form.
Andrzej Rzepliński also gave consideration to Art. 22 (freedom of economic activity), Art. 31 (principle of proportionality) and Art. 41 (personal inviolability and personal freedom). The content of Art. 31(1) ("Freedom of the person shall receive legal protection") -which, in the speaker's opinion should be included in Art. 2 -is not, thankfully, complemented with the statement that the Republic of Poland shall ensure this is realized. "Shall receive legal protection" is a direct command to the constitutional lawmaker, requiring it to compose a logical and complete legal system that will serve the freedom of people. At the same time, everyone is obliged to respect the freedoms and rights of others. No one shall be compelled to do that which is not required by law (Art. 31 (2) Even when such restriction is necessary, a freedom written into the Constitution cannot be "hollowed out", the essence of that right or freedom cannot be "cut out". During the discussion portion of the meeting, the special guest was asked about the legitimacy of the President of Poland refusing to administer the oath of office to three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal selected by the previous parliament (Roman Hauser, Andrzej Jakubecki, and Krzysztof Ślebzak), the potential to bring subsidiary charges in cases concerning suspicion of activity intending to initiate a coup d'état (Art. 128 of the Criminal Code), and the delegalization of a political party employing nondemocratic methods (incompatibility with the Constitution of the programmes or activities of a political party: Art. 12 . In expansive responses, prof. Andrzej Rzepliński answered each of the questions posed to him. Responding to the charge of one member of the audience that Art. 139 of the Constitution of Poland was illogical, prof. Rzepliński stated that constitutional provisions which can be accused of internal inconsistencies or conflicts with other provisions are a part of the "everyday life" of each constitution, not only that of Poland. The more words used in Art. 139, the greater the number of problems there would be. But in these cases we can find support in constitutional courts (by way of illustration, prof. Rzepliński mentioned the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal in the case of the so-called "chair dispute", ruling of 20 May 2009, Kpt 2/08 13 ). Decoding the norm contained in a provision consists not only in reading the provision, but also taking into consideration other verdicts, the entire constitutional context. Such a task can be very difficult at times, and at others virtually impossible for a constitutional court in a dispute where all of the main actors enmeshed in the controversy are present at sessions of the court. Nevertheless, however, together (if only owing to participation of the parties in the proceedings) a logical understanding of the disputes provision is arrived at. An important value in and of itself is the "durability" of constitutional regulation.
He also stated that the erasure of verdicts is a crim against documents, described in Art. 276 Criminal Code.
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